How Trump 2.0 will change American foreign policy

Foreign policy may not have been a central issue during the election, but with Donald Trump returning to the White House, the potential implications for global politics are huge.

Trump’s approach deviates dramatically from the postwar consensus that has seen the U.S. act as a global stabilizer, using its power to promote democracy and ensure security — even when doing so came with financial and military sacrifices. Trump’s unpredictability and willingness to upend longstanding norms could set off a wave of radical change in key regions, potentially reshaping the global order as we know it.

The most dramatic change could occur in Ukraine. The Biden administration has backed Ukraine’s sovereignty but imposed limits on the use of U.S. weapons that hinder Ukraine’s ability to strike back at Russia. While this has frustrated Ukraine, Trump will likely be far worse. He has long demonstrated affinity for Vladimir Putin, while harboring deep disdain for Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky — stemming in part from Zelensky’s refusal to be shaken down by Trump during the scandal that led to Trump’s first impeachment.

The stage could be set for Trump to reduce aid to Ukraine to push Zelensky into negotiations with Russia. Former Trump advisors have articulated such a plan and repeated Russia’s narrative of NATO enlargement triggering the war. Other former Trump officials have proposed more robust support for Ukraine, including lifting the restrictions on Kyiv’s use of American weapons to strike inside Russia.

An abandonment of Ukraine could trigger an earthquake in European politics. The EU would face a difficult choice: step in to fill the void left by the U.S. and rapidly bolster its own defense and aid mechanisms for Ukraine, or risk Russian expansionism moving unchecked.

Abandoning Ukraine risks Putin perceiving a green light to pursue further expansions. Indeed, each time he believes he has faced down the West — as in Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014 and Syria in 2015 — he has launched a larger war within a few years.

Trump seems isolationist, but can also perceive opportunities for a win. The situation in the Middle East is untenable, with Gaza headed toward forever-war status and Iran — whose proxy militias all over the region are an outrage — approaching nuclear-weapon status. Someone needs to pressure much of the leadership in the region, including Qatar, which seeks respectability yet refuses to squeeze Hamas into giving up in Gaza. Trump’s nonchalance about working with authoritarian regimes and his personal relationship with Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman may help.

If Trump makes clear to Iran that it will face military action unless it ends its regional chaos project and stops its nuclear program, this would be applauded in both Jerusalem and Arab capitals. If he pressures Israel — where he has support and credibility — into freezing Jewish settlement deep in the West Bank and assisting with a reasonable day-after plan in Gaza, it would be applauded the world over (including by most Israelis).

In East Asia, Taiwan stands as a beacon of democracy, and its case for protection by the U.S. rests on a longstanding commitment to democratic ideals. But Trump’s view of Taiwan will again be more transactional than ideological.

If Trump opts to leverage Taiwan as a bargaining chip in his trade disputes with China, the region could face heightened tensions. A massive tariff war with China — which Trump threatens — could factor here.

One of Trump’s claimed achievements during his previous administration was his insistence that NATO allies meet their defense spending targets, which nudged them a little. As a result, several member states increased their budgets. Expect him to redouble efforts to demand even higher contributions from NATO members (meaning, at the agreed level).

The accession of Sweden and Finland has strengthened NATO, but Trump’s ambivalence toward NATO could create divisions within the alliance.

The small and often overlooked South Caucasus region may see major repercussions as well. For example, a Trump administration less inclined to protect Armenia’s democratic aspirations, as it pivots away from dependency on Russia, could force European powers into a more proactive stance. This could create fractures within NATO and strain relations within Europe, leaving the door open for increased Russian or Turkish influence in the South Caucasus.

Georgia, long a stalwart democratic and pro-Western country, has been descending into an authoritarian and pro-Russian state, while the West did little. Georgia’s recent elections were clearly manipulated, and tens of thousands of Georgians have taken to the streets in protest. Georgia’s government was certainly cheered by Trump’s election, assuming it will now have carte blanche to continue to repress civil society and turn the country toward Russia, against the expressed will of its people.

Much will depend on Trump’s foreign policy appointments. If he appoints establishment figures who might restrain his impulses, that is one thing — but a team of toadies unable to restrain him would be another. A policy not driven by vendettas, pettiness and ignorance would, for many, be the biggest surprise for all.

Colonel (Ret.) Robert Hamilton heads Eurasia Research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, has been a professor at the U.S. Army War College and served in a variety of overseas posts, including in the Middle East. Dan Perry is the former chief editor of the Associated Press in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, the former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, and the author of two books about Israel.