How a Trump peace ultimatum could end the Russia-Ukraine war

Last week, North Korea’s elite “Storm Corps” furnished Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime with 12,000 soldiers with which to kill my fellow Ukrainians.

President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris have decried this escalation and offered words of support, but not the means to achieve a real victory for Ukraine. This, in effect, has led to the slow hemorrhage of Ukraine in a war of attrition against a larger enemy.

But Donald Trump may well be different from Biden and Harris. I believe he could be the engine of change that Ukraine needs. Why? Because Trump wants peace, and a peace on his terms, not Russia’s.

If he wins, Trump could achieve this by delivering an ultimatum to each side. To Ukraine, he would push President Volodymyr Zelensky to the negotiating table through the lever of U.S. support. To Russia, he could threaten exactly the opposite: An expansion of U.S. support for Ukraine and withering economic warfare against Russia.

This ultimatum would be highly effective. The last three months of the war have exhausted both sides, and this is clear in the situation at the front. A few days ago, Russia made its last desperate attack on four out of five main directions of the Ukrainian front. In this massive though underreported attack, Russia was able to capture about a dozen villages. But now the Russian offensive potential has been exhausted. After large losses in manpower and equipment, the lack of not only strategic but also tactical reserves afflicts the Russians just as the rainy season hits. Since “chernozem” black soil is very common there, it will be impossible to use heavy equipment. Thus, a combination of factors will force Russia to halt until January.

Ukraine’s situation, however, is much worse — there is a dire lack of manpower. What reinforcements come are poorly trained and often do not hold their positions when the Russians advance, which leads to experienced units being surrounded and retreats to new positions. Russia uses its superior numbers ground forces and air power to keep stealing Ukrainian territory slowly and with huge attrition on both sides.

Both sides are nearing a situation that in chess is called Zugzwang, or “a compelled move,” where the player forced to move can only make his own situation worse. Russia is catastrophically lacking the means and forces to continue the offensive; Ukraine only has enough means to slow down the advance, gradually yielding and barely holding the Russians back.

An American finger on the scale in either direction would be enough.

During two months of poor marching conditions, Ukraine will build defenses along the entire front, while Russia will accumulate strategic resources for a new offensive. What is unknown is whether the West will give Ukraine all the necessary equipment and permission to strike deep into Russian territory, to destroy Russian reserves. This uncertainty does not bring optimism to either side. Therefore, it will be in Trump’s own best interest to take all measures and try to end this war with a long-term ceasefire.

The scales of war are slightly in Russia's favor now, but all that will change if America adds money and resources and gives Ukraine the opportunity to destroy Russian strategic objects deep within Russian territory. On the other hand, if America refuses to help Ukraine at all, then the Ukrainian front would fall apart. The victory of either puts the other side on the brink of survival — Ukraine may lose sovereignty, Russia could disintegrate into a kaleidoscope of nuclear-armed feudal states.

My hope is for Ukrainian victory; a U.S. administration would likely see both “maximal” outcomes as disastrous.

Therefore, Trump's position to force a ceasefire is both the safest outcome, and advantageous for his administration. This ultimatum would be adhered to, since the parties have no other option but to sit down at the negotiating, or quickly suffer defeat.

It would be difficult for Ukraine, since the fronts would become borders, and it will be difficult for Russia, too, since Russia was unable to defeat Ukraine and the “new territories” it claims to occupy will remain mostly Ukrainian. Ukraine and Russia would both be forced to withdraw heavy weapons from the borders.

This situation would ultimately favor Ukraine: It would give Ukraine the opportunity to hold elections for a new president and parliament — an urgent necessity, as the old government has legally lost its mandate. With the new government, Ukraine will receive a popular mandate for integration into the European Union and NATO under new military-political conditions or the opportunity to conclude an agreement with America and NATO countries, guaranteeing the preservation of 80 percent of the territories under Ukraine's control and negotiations on the fate of 20 percent under Russia's control.

Ukraine gets at least four years of firm peace with the Trump administration, during which it can complete the reform of its armed forces, begin to form its own defense industry, restore the energy sector and begin to restore the agricultural sector and destroyed infrastructure. At the same time, Ukraine must find a solution to provide for and protect citizens in the occupied territories who retain Ukrainian citizenship.

Only a strong Ukraine, integrated into the Western bloc to one degree or another could eventually ensure the return of territory either as a result of diplomatic efforts by Ukraine and the West, or as a result of the collapse of Russia (like Germany in 1945), or the coming to power of new democratic forces in Russia — with which Ukraine must begin to build special relations now. To achieve the first stage of the ceasefire, and the breathing room, opportunity and security for Ukraine that would follow from it, Trump only needs to make a public offer — or ultimatum — to both parties. Russia and Ukraine would have no choice but to accept this condition. Everything else is catch-22 for them.

Alexander Temerko is a Ukrainian-British businessman and political activist, energy investor, and Councillor of the Institute of Economic Affairs.